

# Blockchain-Enabled Participatory Incentives for Crowdsourced Mesh Networks

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## Introduction

There is need for a system which coordinates flow of economic value in mesh networks that is:

- Transparent: shared across participants,
- Automated: avoid cost, delays, errors of manual accounting,
- Decentralized: diverse participants,
- Secure: calculations and money transfers are safe, automated, irreversible.

MeshDapp, a value transfer platform for mesh networks that uses a local Ethereum Proof-of-Authority blockchain + Solidity smart contracts.

**We designed & implemented *Fair*, a new economic model for MeshDApp.**

**The goal is to reach a win-win situation for the network and the users.**

## Context of the economic model

Crowdsourced mesh networks built, maintained and used by several participants. How to collect funds from consumers and distribute them to providers?

- **Consumers** pay to the common funds account for using the network for Internet access or other services.
- **Providers** are paid (from the common funds account) for their contribution in building and maintaining the network infrastructure.




Figure 1: Example of a mesh network scenario where the infrastructure is owned by different providers

## Economic Model

**Each provider will be paid for the amount of forwarded MB with different price/MB.**

In fact, the main idea is *the more devices a provider has, the higher its price/MB forwarded will be, up to a certain limit.*

- The goal is to provide an incentive for providers to invest in the network by adding more devices to expand its coverage and improve its density and capacity.
- As it is not so good for the diversity of the network that one provider  $P$  owns too many devices  $D$ , we define a price limit  $p_{max}$  and the target number of devices (incentive),  $I = \left\lfloor \frac{3\#D}{2\#P} \right\rfloor$ , for which  $p$  stops to increase at  $p_{max}$ .
- To ensure prices cover minimum costs, we define  $p_{min}$  for a provider with only a single device.

The final price function for each provider is:

$$p_i = \begin{cases} p_{min} + \frac{p_{max}-p_{min}}{I-1} \times (D_i - 1) & ; \text{if } D_i \leq I \\ p_{max} & ; \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$




Figure 2: Price/MB ( $p_i$ ) of a provider vs its number of devices

## Assumptions:

- We do not address the problem of collecting payments from consumers. For that we assume “infinite funds” in a common account.
- Forwarded MB in a device is  $\min(tx, rx)$ .
- At each iteration, a provider decides to add a new device with probability  $pr_1$  or  $pr_2$  (depending on the number of devices it has), given that it has the necessary tokens to buy.

## Evaluation

**Data:** Forwarded MB from QMPSU mesh network, every hour during one month, for 62 devices.

**Economic models tested:**

- Fair: our proposed model,  $pr_1 = 0.7$ ,  $pr_2 = 0.2$ .
- Unbounded: *Fair* without  $p_{max}$ ,  $pr = 0.7$ .
- Fixed-Price: constant price  $\forall$  providers,  $pr = 0.2$ .

**Initial state:**

- Number of providers: 2, 5 or 10.
- Initial #devices per provider: 1 or 3,  $pr = 0.5$ .

**Measured variables:**

- Size of the network over time.
- Number of devices per provider over time.
- Number of tokens per provider over time.

## Results

**Fair economic model**




Figure 3: Ensures a fair and controlled growth of provider

**Unbounded economic model**




Figure 4: Increases the deviation between providers

**Fixed-Price economic model**




Figure 5: Makes providers grow slowly




Figure 6: *Fair* incentive for providers to invest in the network




Figure 7: *Fair* model ensures that providers earn tokens

## Conclusion

- Win-win situation ensured: the network grows and providers compensated for their investment.
- $p_{max}$  is an incentive for growth, avoid centralization with a few large providers controlling supply.

## Future work

- Use a more realistic distribution for probabilities of adding a new device.
- Test the model in a real environment.
- Compare to alternative models, including auctions.